Abstract
These three questions can intuitively be seen as problems of coherence within EU administrative law that are specifically raised by some kinds of bottom-up composite procedures. But in order to confirm whether these three questions really are about legal coherence, we require a sharper understanding of coherence as a starting point for their discussion. Yet, it appears that the concept of coherence itself may well be one of the most controversial in legal theory and philosophy. 6 My aim is not to be a participant in this debate, but rather an observer, thereby drawing from it only some key concepts that may help us in examining whether the three issues mentioned above are questions of coherence, and if so, how we may answer them. As one author points out, scholarly discussion on the definition of coherence has tended to end in theoretical capitulation by claiming coherence is too complex a term to be defined.
7 However, there are many different meanings that coherence can take, which are summarised by Kress, who states: 'an idea or theory is coherent (…) if it hangs or fits together, if its parts are mutually supportive, if it is intelligible, if it flows from or expresses a single unified viewpoint'. 8 One should not, however, overstate the importance of intelligibility, which is often mistaken to be a necessary element of coherence altogether when in fact it is merely a necessary element of many objects whose coherence is tested. 9 Rather, as Pethick suggests, 10 in the conceptual delimitation of coherence we should take as point of departure its most intuitive notion, which is closest to its everyday usage in our natural language. 11 Coherence can be both a property of an object -a version of a story can be internally coherent -and a type of relationship between two objects -two versions of a story can cohere with each other. More generally, coherence is used in the sense of composite parts of a single object or different related objects 'sticking together', meaning that they mutually and symmetrically fit together as a whole. Coherence must further be distinguished from consistency. Consistency is about the absence of contradictions whereas coherence is a function of the (variable) extent to which a set of propositions makes sense when taken together.
12
I am indebted to Professor Stephen Pethick for raising attention to the intense theoretical controversies on coherence. 6 Stephen Pethick, 'On the Entanglement of Coherence', in: Ratio Juris (2014) , 116 ff, 125 and 128. The Borelli doctrine raises, in particular, doubts about normative coherence.
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Normative coherence concerns the justifiability of legal propositions by reference to their broader context in the legal system, and in particular under higher-order principles and values. 14 Normative coherence thus depends on the possibility to justify legal propositions as situated in a continuum with the pre-existing body of law, and as derivable from the binding rules of the system. 15 Drawing inspiration from Dworkin's work, and the idea of law as integrity, one could say that interpreters must make their interpretive claims on legal provisions based on 'the assumption that they were all created by a single author -the community personified -expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness'. 16 Interpretation thus becomes like the continuous writing of a chain novel by relying on the materials previously laid out by others and respecting the overall unity of the narrative. 17 In this contribution, after recapitulating the facts and the solutions in the case and clarifying the scope of the Court's findings, three claims will successively be made. One claim for each reservation made by legal scholars to the Borelli doctrine that were identified above, and which can now be understood as three different issues of coherence. The first problem is that the same Court that constitutionalised EU law, and in particular incorporated into it the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, decided Borelli by denying judicial protection to the applicant. To this respect, there is one insight we can gain from the metaphors of the chain novel or of a sole hypothetical author that is guided by the same principles. Namely, it may lead us to unveil the puzzle of whether the Borelli doctrine represents, in EU administrative law, the continuity or disruption of EU law's previous 'constitutional chapters'. Therefore, in other words, whether the Borelli doctrine and the Court's essential constitutional doctrines are mutually supportive and fit together. In this regard, I will defend that, in developing the Borelli doctrine, the CJEU articulated a possible way out of the strict dualistic structure of EU administrative law. A way out that was both defensible and indeed coherent in the light of fundamental principles built up in the CJEU's previous constitutionalising case law.
The second problem concerns the criteria of reviewability of national intermediate measures in Borelli situations. It concerns whether these criteria are convincingly argued as standing in continuity with the CJEU's earlier underNormative coherence is to be distinguished from narrative coherence, which concerns the 'justification of findings of fact and the drawing of reasonable inferences from evidence'. The distinction is drawn by N. MacCormick (n 12) 189. standing of the criteria that the need for an appropriate level of judicial protection dictates for the review of EU measures. I will challenge the claim that the Borelli doctrine suggests a double standard by submitting the exact opposite -that it can actually be seen as an instance of what has been called vertical equivalence.
The third problem, unlike the previous two, does not relate to the interpretive coherence of judges in regard to pre-existing sources, but to the coherence of institutional, procedural and remedial dimensions of EU administrative law. Here, one may question whether the basic principles guiding the EU's model of administrative justice are the same as those which underpin the structure of composite procedures. While that model is meant for measures and actions that are unambiguously imputable to the national or EU administrative spheres, composite procedures are founded on decisional hybridity. Here, I will agree to the frequent claim that Borelli exposes a system of administrative justice that has been outgrown by the EU's current administrative institutional reality, and I will examine how, for as long as substantial revision of the Treaties does not take place, we could address the concerns arsing in Borelli.
2 Borelli: the Facts and the Doctrine. The Jurisdictional and the Substantive Borelli Principles
The Borelli Case can be said to be the seminal judgment in the law of composite procedures. It is often said to have been the first time that the problems of articulation between European and national courts in reviewing hybrid decision-making were addressed.
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An Italian company requested funding from the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) in order to build an oil mill. Under Regulation 355/77, it was the role of national authorities to assess whether projects conformed with the requirements for the disbursement of funds. As each project had to be co-funded by the EU and by the Member State in which it would be carried out, the granting of aid by the Commission depended on the issue of a positive opinion by the relevant national authority, 19 in the case, the Region of Liguria.
Upon receiving a negative opinion, the Commission informed the applicants that their request was denied. The latter sought to challenge the Commission's decision before the CJEU, claiming that the Italian administrative measure on R. Caranta, 'Sull'impugnabilità degli atti endoprocedimentali adottati dalle autorità nazionali nelle ipotesi di coamministrazione ', Il Foro amministrativo (1994) which it was based was illegal. Liguria had allegedly performed an erroneous assessment of the contracts between Borelli and its olive producers by concluding that they neither showed enough guarantees of authenticity, nor ensured a lasting share of the economic benefits resulting from the project. These were among the requirements to be met for the aid to be granted. The company argued that the Court had to accept the challenge of the Commission's final act, since Liguria's negative opinion was qualified in Italian law as a preparatory measure, and therefore excluded from judicial review. Borelli argued that a final decision adopted in such conditions should be annulled, as it 'encapsulates all the decisions of the institutions and bodies involved in the procedure' and absorbs in itself the irregularity of intermediate acts.
In essence, the Court followed the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Darmon in its answer. An answer that entails both judicial procedural and substantive elements. Given the fact that those two dimensions were applied and adapted separately in subsequent judgments, I will refer to them as the jurisdictional and the substantive Borelli principles, respectively. These refer to two basic issues in any action for annulment. The first, the jurisdictional Borelli principle, concerns the identification of the competent judiciary who can review a measure. The second Borelli principle relates to the grounds for its invalidity and, more specifically, to the invalidating relevance of irregularities occurring throughout the procedure. Together, the two principles form what I will call the Borelli doctrine.
The jurisdictionalBorelli principle is found in the CJEU's and the AG's 20 claim that it is the task of national courts to review the validity of intermediate domestic measures that leave no discretion to EU bodies. When measures such as binding opinions determine in themselves the final outcome of the procedure and are 'capable of adversely affecting third parties', they must be subject to judicial review before national courts, on 'the same terms on which they review any definitive measure adopted by the same national authority'. It should be noted that the ruling in Borelli was delivered in the light of legislation on the granting of EAGGF agricultural aids that is nowadays repealed. Nevertheless, in subsequent case law, the EU judicature showed the versatility of the Borelli doctrine by applying it to other bottom-up composite procedures in the area of Protected Designations of Origin (PDOs) and Geographic Indications (GIs).
The continuous use of the two Borelli principles in disputes located in such wholly unrelated policy fields demonstrates that they form a generalisable doctrine of EU administrative law, which aims at solving issues of annulment in some instances of hybrid decision-making. Borelli constitutes a doctrine whose scope of application is not conditional upon the substantive standards for decision-making enshrined in the relevant sectorial legislation, but solely upon the structural properties of the administrative procedures aimed at implementing them.
In light of the case law of the CJEU, the key criterion to determine whether the Borelli principles ought to be applied remains twofold. First, a national authority must have adopted an administrative measure which, according to the relevant EU legislation, 'formspart of a Community decision-making procedure' (emphasis added). 30 Secondly, and cumulatively, the Borelli doctrine requires that such a measure 'is binding on the Community decision-taking authority and therefore determines the terms of the Community decision to be adopted'.
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In later cases, relating to the field of PDOs and GIs, the Court paraphrased the original formula and confirmed the two conditions by maintaining that the Borelli doctrine can be used solely to challenge a national interlocutory act 'which constitutes a necessary step in the procedure for adoption of a Community measure, [and in The Borelli doctrine shows great versatility, as its scope can be positively defined as encompassing all administrative procedures following a structure that fulfils these two conditions. Beyond the field of PDOs and GIs, 33 the wide variety of procedures relating to the administration of EU tariff quotas displays a multitude of situations in which the Borelli principles may easily find application.
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The same criterion of disparity in the allocation of discretion within bottomup procedures can also be used to determine the ambit of the Borelli doctrine in a negative sense, i.e., situations that do not fall under its scope. This is confirmed in the CJEU's line of reasoning in subsequent cases in which litigants unsuccessfully attempted to use the Borelli doctrine in an administrative procedure that did not display the structural properties required by the Borelli case law. In Association Greenpeace France, a case relating to the general authorisation framework for the placing of GMO products on the market, 35 the assessment of public health and environmental risks by national authorities of the Member State in which the product is to be first placed on the market. A negative result will immediately terminate the procedure. Otherwise, the authority sends to the Commission a positive assessment report with all the information the notifier has provided. The Commission will then open a multilateral stage by distributing the report to all the other relevant national authorities, which may then lodge objections to the issue of the authorisation. The absence of objections from other Member States will count as tacit consent and the first authority ends the procedure by giving its 'consent in writing' to the notifier. However, an objection will trigger a European dispute settlement stage in which the Commission will decide on the matter. If the Commission then decides to authorise the placing on the market of the GMO product, the first national authority issues its consent in writing. CJEU examined whether national intermediate measures in such a procedure could, on the one hand, determine the invalidity of the Commission's final decision if they were themselves invalid and, on the other hand, whether they could be the object of a separate judicial review.
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As AG Mischo explained,
37
'unlike the situation that obtained in Oleificio Borelli (…), we do not have an unfavourable national decision, which would necessarily have led to an unfavourable decision by the Community, but on the contrary a favourable one, which (…) did not automatically entail a favourable decision by the Community but did make it possible' (emphasis added).
Following the AG's reasoning, the Court ended up admitting that the Commission's decision could, under certain conditions, be invalid on the ground that the preceding national measure was invalid, thus excluding the application of the substantive Borelli principle.
However, in what would at first sight appear to be a contradiction, the jurisdictional Borelli principle still found application as the CJEU explicitly stated that the first measure could be challenged before national courts. The reason is that, in the context of the general GMO authorisation scheme, the decisiveness of the intermediate national positive report for the content of the final decision will depend on circumstances that its issuing authority cannot control or predict at the time in which it decides (i.e., whether authorities from other states will object). Indeed, as the CJEU recognised, the 'decision of the competent authority is the prerequisite for the Community procedure and, in the absence of any indication to the contrary from another Member State (…), may even determine its outcome' (emphasis added). 38 If that interlocutory decision is not judicially challenged by citizens, but objected to by other authorities, then the EU stage is opened. Questions of eventual contamination effects from a preceding illegal draft domestic measure can only arise once a decision is adopted through the exercise of the Commission's discretion. However, if no objections are raised, the rapporteur national authority's will issue at the conclusion of the procedure a final decision whose content will mirror the findings of its prior positive assessment report. This differentiation from Borelli in Association Greenpeace France, in which the substantive dimension of Borelli is excluded, but the jurisdictional dimension is not, can be assumed to be valid for many authorisation schemes that follow fundamentally the same procedural structure. Judgments such as Greenpeace France confirmed the conditions for the application of the Borelli doctrine and made clear that litigants cannot rely on its two principles when national intermediate administrative measures do not predetermine the substance of decisional outcomes in subsequent procedural phases.
40 Though I will only examine in sections 4 and 5 what would justify this differentiation, it is crucial to highlight for now that EU courts, when developing the Borelli doctrine, have insisted on the importance of the degree to which the national, interlocutory measures, bind the ensuing decision-taking EU body. For this reason, and at least partly, I must depart from the view supported by authors such as Eliantonio. Eliantonio considers that the reasoning in Borelli applies to all measures constituting 'mere preparatory steps', without distinction as to whether such measures may be overturned in subsequent stages unfolding before EU authorities, whether they only bear effects within the procedure, or whether they predetermine the content of its final decisional outcome in the procedure.
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I agree with Eliantonio on the scope of the jurisdictional dimension of Borelli concerning those national draft authorisations that one finds in the relevant procedure for the introduction of novel foods into the internal market. Indeed, as was explained above, this would follow from a straightforward application of the Court's findings in Association Greenpeace France. 42 However, I must depart from the consideration that, as a consequence of the Borelli case law, the objections raised by other national authorities to the draft measure of the rapporteur national authority should be held as reviewable. 43 The reason for this in Borelli were not held as reviewable (at 83). However, as will be discussed in the next section, such risks arise fundamentally in situations where the Court, in assessing EU legal acts, would need to look into national procedural irregularities, and simultaneously be barred from doing so by the limits of its own jurisdiction. This problem does not arise when the EU judiciary does not need to go beyond evaluating the conformity with EU law of the acts of an EU body that authoritatively defines the content of the challenged measure in the composite procedure. In that case, the irregularities are fully imputable to the EU authority, and direct action under Article 263 TFEU becomes possible. As set out before (see n 39), this is an administrative procedure which follows in essence the same structure as the procedure in the case. 
Defending the Coherence of Borelli with the Broader Scenario of EU Constitutional Law
If (EU) administrative law is to make a claim to be concretised (EU) constitutional law, its content must be held to be arguable for as imposed by or as derived from the constitution's principles. 46 As was explained above, From here, it is not difficult to conclude that, when scholars make claims about whether a given administrative legal institution constitutes concretized constitutional law, either by being imposed by the constitution (strong derivability) or plausibly supported by constitutional norms (weak derivability), they are in fact making claims about the coherence between administrative and constitutional law. In this section, I will examine whether the two principles of the Borelli doctrine cohere with the EU constitutional order by testing whether they can be justified in the light of the founding principles of the EU constitutional order.
However, it should first be noted that academic reaction to Borelli was initially scarce, 49 and that a considerable part of the studies on composite procedures have relied on merely descriptive approaches to the Case. 50 As opposed to examining what it actually implicates for the broader construction of European administrative law and administrative justice. However, one also finds very apprehensive responses to the case law. Both the jurisdictional and substantive claims in Borelli are criticised by della Cananea, who argues that the CJEU's 'unexpected' decision to refuse to review the final act of the Commission risks the principle of effective judicial protection. 51 In the author's view, it seems, the CJEU should not have rejected Lastly, Gaja makes the claim that the Court should be considered to be entitled, in principle, 'to examine all the questions that are relevant for ascertaining the validity of the Community act -whether these questions relate to facts, EC law or national law', as 'there is no reason why it should not do so when it is necessary in order to exercise its judicial functions'. 56 The argument made by
Gaja continues with the claim that the reasons behind Foto-Frost and its assertion that only the CJEU should be able to annul a measure of EU law do not apply in the opposite sense, of precluding its jurisdiction over national intermediate measures. In Gaja's view, attributing to the CJEU the power to annul composite measures as the one in Borelli would not damage in any way the unity and the uniformity of EU law. An alternative view is offered in this paper. It is submitted that the reasons advanced by the CJEU in the Foto-Frost ruling to exclude national judicial review of EU acts are the same which would lead us to see the two Borelli principles as a solution to judicial review of composite decision-making. A solution which adequately responds to the specific demands posed by EU constitutional law. Those reasons in Foto-Frost, if one may recall, are essentially the coherence of the EU system of judicial protection and the unity of EU law.
57
As Koen Lenaerts rightfully points out, the competence of EU courts, much like the competences of the other EU institutions, is delimited by the principle However, this is not a purely formal argument. It should be noted that to insist on the strict separation between national and European judicial power is to insist on the exclusive subjection of each authority to its own set of courts. It is to highlight that one's administration cannot be rendered accountable before any other judicial branch, 59 and therefore, it is to secure its relative independence in the framework of a multilevel administrative system. The Court has long conceived of the EU constitutional model of administration as a dualistic system, in the sense of being premised on a strict divide of spheres of administrative power, on a so-called Trennungsprinzip. The Court therefore seemed to embrace the doctrine according to which the Treaties' system, and in particular the principles regulating the relations between the EU and the states, had established a scheme of executive federalism for Indirect Administration premised on the German constitutional model. 64 The doctrine that the EEC Treaty enshrined 'the principle of the Member States' executive', 65 akin 'to the principle of Länderexekutive in Article 83 GG', had long been defended by academics who were directly involved in the making of the EEC Treaty.
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As one can see, the CJEU's classic case law assumes that from the EU constitutional order one can derive a dualistic model of administrative authorities and judiciaries. 67 Since Humblet, it has considered a 'principle of strict separation . Those who adhere to this perspective tend to consider that the traditional dichotomy between Direct and Indirect Administration has lost much of its significance or has indeed been 'abandoned' by existing forms of EU decision-making (M. Eliantonio (n 3), 77). Rather, the evolving cooperative practices in multilevel administrative implementation of EU laws and policies have accumulated to form a composite or integrated administration that stands in contrast with that model. One can, however, understand administrative dualism as a strictly legal construct, a doctrine which corresponded to the aspirations of the main political actors of integration, and which was stabilised by the Court in its reading of the EU constitution as the EU's standard model of administrative power. Administrative dualism is, from the perspective supported here, not a descriptive framework aimed at producing an accurate account on institutional facts, but normative legal framework, a legal regime resulting from the two-track system of spheres of administrative authority, of courts, and of the bodies of law governing each of them. According to this view, 68 In this model, each sphere of administrative power is institutionally and legally independent from each other, enjoys its own source of legitimacy, and is subject to its own set of courts. 69 However, it is very important to be aware that, in the dualistic model presupposed in the CJEU's rulings, such independence does not equal the assumption that the two levels of administration should exercise their powers with their backs turned against each other. Rather, EU administrative dualism relies on a spirit of 'loyal independence' of the different administrative jurisdictions. Perhaps in no other ruling is it more evident than in Wünsche that the Court has long seen such 'loyal independence' as the constitutionally determined essence of the structure of administration in the EU. It was there that the Court found that, in the first common organisation of the markets in cereals, the forms of interaction between national administrative authorities and the Commission, 'both performing on their own initiative [in the French version: responsabilité] their duties under Community law' but still acting in 'close cooperation', had been constructed 'in accordance with the structure of the Community' itself (emphasis added).
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However, the description of this two-track system would not be complete without adding that the ultimate guarantee of the separateness of the two administrative spheres comes from the fact that each one of them is subject to its own law, and to its own criteria of legality. While national authorities are subject the dualistic model can easily accommodate the overwhelming majority of institutions, procedures and cooperative institutional practices usually described as composite administration (for a similar view, see J. Ziller, 'Introduction: les concepts d'administration directe, d'administration indirecte et de co-administration et les fondements du droit administrative européen', in: J.-B. Auby & J. Dutheil de la Rochère, Droit Administratif Européen (Brussels 2007), 235 ff). Gradually, since the first EU regimes of relevance for administrative activity, nature of the cooperation between national and EU authorities shifted from the predominantly informal to more institutionalised, procedural forms of cooperation (this has been accurately observed in the field of structural funds by B. Schöndorf-Haubold, 'Common European Administration: the European Structural Funds', in: E. Schmidt-Aßmann, European Composite Administration (2011), 25 ff, 53. However, some forms of procedural cooperation -composite procedures -did far more than simply coordinating autonomous public powers with a view to ensure the effective implementation of Community policies. Instead, they crossed the boundaries of mutual collaboration into decisional interdependence by establishing decisional frameworks in which none of the two levels can validly adopt a final measure without previous procedural input from the other. Herein lies the fundamental constitutional problem of composite procedures: they display a structural inadequacy to the model of administration that the Court historically held to be ordered by EU constitutional law. In these terms, as we can see, other than the concern with not invading national courts' sphere of competence, there seems to be an implicit concern in the articulation of the substantive Borelli principle. That concern is the safeguard of the very principle of the autonomy of the European legal order, which can be said to be the existential bedrock of EU law. 75 And, through the defence of the autonomy of EU law, the invariability of its validity throughout the Member States, and thereby its unity and uniformity -its coherence -regardless of the Member State in which the composite procedure began. The decisiveness of this concern is admittedly not entirely clear in the Borelli ruling. At first sight, the justification that the Court provides for the substantive Borelli principle seems to be one of a merely judicial procedural nature. In particular, the substantive dimension of the ruling appears to be depicted as a conceptual necessity in regard to the partition of judicial jurisdiction expressed in what I previously called the jurisdictional Borelli principle. However, it is not so obvious that it is plausible to draw substantive conclusions (the validity of a decision) from judicial-procedural premises (the exclusion of jurisdiction over a decision-making stage). Especially if one takes into account that both in Borelli and in subsequent case-law applicants argued that the challenged national intermediate measures had breached a rule of EU law. Assuming that Borelli was right about the procedure breaching Regulation 355/77, then it becomes indeed hard to see how the CJEU could have so easily admitted that a Commission decision is not made illegal when the requirements for its adoption are disregarded.
One must however read the CJEU's reference to the partition of judicial competences in the context of the significance of those rules in the development of EU constitutional law. Since the earliest, seminal cases on the autonomy of the EU legal system, the limits of the jurisdiction of the CJEU have been invoked not simply as a justification for that autonomy, but as an expression of a general principle of independence of the EU legal order. 76 The exclusive use in EU courts of EU legal sources, and the exclusiveness of review of EU legal acts, served a historical purpose of providing concrete arguments for the self-sufficiency and autonomy of the EU legal system.
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The constitutional contextualisation of the usage of provisions on the CJEU's jurisdiction should provide us with a suitable framework to understand what lies deeper within the reasoning of Borelli. That being the awareness that the simultaneous involvement of several autonomous legal orders in the making of the final measure makes its review far more complex from a constitutional standpoint. We have good reason to think that this concern was noticeably present in the Borelli case: Borelli was, as AG Darmon put it, about an administrative measure that had been 'drawn up in the context of two distinct legal systems'.
78
The two Borelli principles were the only possible response the CJEU could have given, as it could have neither 'reinterpreted' its jurisdiction to extend it to domestic measures, 79 nor opened the door to contamination effects from national intermediate measures to final European decisions. To articulate anything different from the substantive Borelli principle would have amounted to, in practice, indirectly making the administrative law that is meant to govern national authorities (including strictly domestic rules), the standard of legality of the Commission's decisions before EU courts. In turn, this would have undermined the independence of EU legal acts from national sources as a basic corollary of autonomy of the legal order, 80 and as a fundamental guarantee of integrity of the EU legal system. The substantive dimension of the Borelli doctrine is easier to understand when we consider the problems which would result from the acceptance of contamination effects based on the incompatibility of intermediate national measures with national administrative law. Nonetheless, contaminations based on their contrariety to EU law rules would not be much less problematic. It makes no difference that the adopted national intermediate measure breaches a rule enacted by an EU or national legislator.
To make the validity of legal acts of the EU dependent on national authorities' compliance with the law meant to govern their action, is to turn the legal constraints of national power into the legal constraints of the Commission's decisions through the backdoor. It is also making EU administrative decisionmaking power vulnerable to the poor exercise of national administrative power. Both notions are incompatible with the institutional autonomy of EU bodies from national power, which is one of the cornerstones of EU supranationality.
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Just as the substantive Borelli principle can be reconstructed as a corollary of constitutional separatism of legal orders and spheres of authority, the jurisdictional Borelli principles finds its first foundation in the separateness of national and EU judiciaries. The importance that the CJEU attached to the principle Only to give an example, Portuguese and German administrative laws associate similar consequences to the qualification of absolute nullity of administrative acts, such as the possibility 82 of challenge at any time. However, whereas Portuguese law (Art. 161/2 h) of the Code of Administrative Procedure) qualifies as absolutely null and void decisions adopted without the necessary deliberative quorum, German law explicitly excludes that qualification for decisions in the same circumstances ( § 44 (3), 3 VwVfG). If one admitted that an intermediate measure adopted without quorum could result in the illegality of a final European decision in composite procedures, how would an action for annulment function where the consequences of the irregularity are different in the Member States? Would the Court have to set aside the time limits in Article 263 (6) TFEU, depending on the Member State in which the procedure started? Such questions, in themselves, make clear to what extent the most important theoretical cornerstone of the autonomy of EU law -its 'Community' character -would be undermined if the Court had not elaborated the substantive Borelli principle. As R. Barents explains (The Autonomy of Community Law (The Hague 2004), 239-240), there is no autonomy of the legal order of the EU without its indivisibility, meaning the invariability of its validity (or of its forms of invalidity, I would add) and application throughout the territories of the Member States. This line of thought is present in many rulings of the Court. See, for instance, Case 48-71 Commission v Italian Republic, § 8: 'attainment of the objectives of the Community requires that the rules of Community law established by the Treaty itself or arising from procedures which it has instituted are fully applicable (…) with identical effects over the whole territory of the Community without the Member States being able to place any obstacles in the way'. R. Barents, ibid., 265. Regardless of how sound the constitutional justification of the position is the CJEU's refusal to review national intermediate administrative measures in composite procedures came at a price. EU courts cannot review the final measure, because it would imply reviewing domestic legal acts and accepting the relevance of their validity for the validity of EU measures. But national courts cannot review the final decision of the Commission either, since that would subvert the Treaty's system of judicial competences. It would thus seem that no judicial protection can be afforded at all.
It is here, however, that the jurisdictional Borelli principle shows its second foundation: the fundamental right to an effective judicial protection.
The CJEU is well aware that the practical implications of its constitutional restraints can result in a negative conflict of jurisdictions and ultimately in a denial of justice by both national and European Courts. Instead of keeping silent on the position of private parties, in the Borelli case law the CJEU insisted that no one should be deprived of remedies as a result of the separation of legal orders and judiciaries. 86 The CJEU could have simply dismissed such a claim as inadmissible by invoking its own incompetence, as it had done before when presented with annulment claims against national measures. 87 In a short ruling, and without further considerations. Instead, the CJEU explained in considerable depth why the national measure should be reviewable and affirmed that it would stand by the applicants' side if a national court refused to offer them judicial protection. In itself, this already suggests that the CJEU sees a relevant difference between the review of interlocutory domestic measures in composite procedures, and any other national legal acts. For the CJEU to remain indifferent to the special vulnerability of individuals trapped in the vacuum between legal orders and judiciaries, it would have had to offer a solution that would have been grossly incoherent with its belief in being bound to draw inspiration from the Member States' standards of protection for fundamental rights.
88 As well as with the proclamation of a complete AG Mischo in Greenpeace France, § 99. In Borelli, the application of the two principles meant that the judicial protection of the company was denied by the CJEU. How, then, to explain the apparent paradox that the Case is quoted by EU courts as emblematic for effective judicial protection?
Concerning Borelli, it is rarely pointed-out that the CJEU's margin to afford, by itself, the judicial protection that the applicants sought was considerably reduced by the limits of its jurisdiction and by principles of EU constitutional law. Therefore, the great dilemma was to find a way out of the trap of competences and legal orders the applicant in Borelli found itself in, and to ensure that the principle of effective judicial protection would not be sacrificed. The jurisdictional Borelli principle expresses the method the CJEU adopted to solve this conflict.
On the whole, Borelli is, in my view, coherent with EU constitutional law because the CJEU detected a problem of articulation of principles and proposed a solution that it could plausibly defend as one finding sound support in the EU's constitutional principles. That solution was to defer to national courts the review of the intermediate measures. One should bear in mind that the development of an EU protection of fundamental rights derives from a historical political imperative to ensure national judicial acceptance of the EU's -and 90 the ECJ's -authority (J.H.H. Weiler (n 80), 107 ff). The Court's decidedness to clearly articulate how judicial protection from composite administration should be carried out echoes earlier concerns of safeguarding EU decision-making from the review of national courts. One can seriously doubt whether in the long run the Member States and their courts would accept the rise of a powerful administration that is anchored in a plurality of legal orders, but finds judicial limitation in none. The explicit articulation of a jurisdictional Borelli principle beyond the dismissal of Oleificio Borelli's annulment claim signalled to national courts that they could, under EU law, ensure the right to an effective judicial protection without reviewing the final decision. By doing so, the Court avoided that national courts undermined its exclusive jurisdiction to review the legality of EU measures by taking up for themselves the task of ensuring judicial protection when it would become apparent that no judiciary was competent to review the final measure.
Review In Borelli, the only argument put forth by applicants for the illegality of the final measure was that it was adopted subsequent to a purportedly illegal domestic measure. The reasoning underlying the claim, that the final act of the procedure 'encapsulates all the decisions of the institutions and bodies involved in the procedure', has to be understood in light of the traditional administrative legal concept of procedural concentration.
According to this concept, which is present in both national and European administrative justice, only the challenge of definitive decisions affords the opportunity for the invocation of irregularities that occurred throughout the preceding procedure.
91 However, as we saw, if the CJEU had fully upheld procedural concentration and begun to review the final Commission measures in the Borelli case law, it would necessarily have had to betray both the limits of its jurisdiction and the autonomy of EU law. The partial sacrifice of the concept, resulting from these considerations, meant in practice the purge of national intermediate measures from review by EU courts, and therefore their inaptitude to produce the final European decision's invalidity through 'contamination effects'. It also means 'severing' the procedure in two for the purposes of treating intermediate domestic decisions as if they were the final outcome. Possibly, the most powerful critique to the Borelli doctrine came from Herwig Hofmann. The author criticises the CJEU for displaying, in general, 'a tendency to refer cases to Member States' courts and oblige them to offer legal protection in much more lenient conditions than it itself is ready to give'.
92 In Hofmann's view, the jurisdictional Borelli principle is incoherent with the CJEU's own case law -notably, the IBM ruling, which established the inadmissibility of annulment claims against preparatory measures. The claim I would like to make is the exact opposite. It is crucial that we look into the concrete framing and positive justification of the jurisdictional Borelli principle -the justification as to why national courts should review the relevant intermediate measures, as opposed to the justification as to why the CJEU should not. It is submitted here that one can actually see the construction of the jurisdictional Borelli principle as the extension to national administrative justice for the concepts and standards of annulment claims before the CJEU against EU bodies. By making a localised use of the technique of 'vertical E. García de Enterría (note 30), 302 ff. In EU law, one can mention the classic works of A. Barav & G. Vandersanden, Contentieux Communautaire (Brussels 1977) , 144: 'les effets jur- equivalence', the CJEU actually achieved coherence in judicial protection against composite decision-making procedures. The extension of those standards can be seen both in the delimitation of the kind of administrative measures that, in the course of a mixed procedure, should be regarded as reviewable, and in the criteria for standing implied in the jurisdictional Borelli principle. The concept of vertical equivalence has been constructed by reference to the principle of equivalence as a limit to national procedural autonomy. The principle forbids national remedial rules from being less favourable to actions aimed at defending rights derived from EU law than the rules governing similar domestic actions.
93 Vertical equivalence, by contrast, can be defined as the CJEU's technique of referring to the standards of judicial protection before European courts as the minimum standards of judicial protection it expects national courts to afford to individuals invoking EU law. 94 As an example of this reasoning, national courts must receive liability claims based on a breach of EU law, even against legislators, because the Treaties do not differentiate the admissibility of similar claims according to the EU body generating the damages. 95 Moreover, the CJEU cannot declare, by itself, a period of 60 days for annulment of national administrative acts as unreasonable or objectionable because that is the same time limit governing annulment claims against EU measures. 96 It is understandable that the CJEU demands national courts to provide litigants, at the very least, with a degree of protection that is not inferior to the minimum protection they would obtain before EU courts in analogous proceedings. After all, the CJEU has historically insisted on a banner of coherence and completeness in the EU system of judicial protection. Indeed, in some cases, the aim to maintain a 'coherent system' of remedies is even explicitly mentioned as the reason why national courts should offer a level of protection that is, at least, analogous to the level of protection prescribed by the Treaties. suspension of enforcement of the contested act and empowers the Court to order such suspension. The coherence of the system of interim legal protection therefore requires that, in the context of a preliminary reference to be made by a national court, the latter should also be able to order suspension of enforcement of a national administrative measure based on a Community regulation, the legality of which is in dispute and which only the Court of Justice may declare to be invalid'. Member States from offering more generous conditions, for access to courts and judicial review, than EU law itself offers. 98 In fact, sometimes the CJEU has even demanded a degree of protection from the Member States that is more liberal than the degree it would provide under analogous circumstances.
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Vertical equivalence does not describe the development by the CJEU of a system of remedies against EU bodies based on judicial standards analogous to those it requires from Member States. Quite the opposite, it describes the fact that the CJEU has often set the remedial standards before EU Courts as the lowest threshold of judicial protection the States must ensure. The fact that the CJEU often demands that national courts provide a higher level of protection to individuals than it would provide at the EU level against EU bodies does not contradict that it demands a level of protection from Member States that is at least as generous as one would find in EU Courts, against EU bodies. It is interesting to note how some national courts have also applied the reasoning of vertical equivalence without previous guidance from the Court. To give an example, the Italian Consiglio 100 di Stato (Sez. VI -Ruling of 10th of May 2011, no. 2755) decided by way of appeal on an action for annulment brought by an environmental NGO against Puglia's Regional Faunal Hunting Plan (piano faunistico venatorio). The Consiglio di Stato considered that to simply eliminate the challenged act would deprive Puglia of any regional discipline for hunting restrictions. The argument that followed was that, protection of the environment being a shared competence of the Member States and the EU, 'the standards of judicial protection cannot be different, depending on the acts being adopted at Community or national level'. The Consiglio therefore explicitly referred to Article 264 TFEU and to the Court's case-law declaring the illegality of EU measures but imposing on EU a moratorium to substitute them for lawful regimes (Case 81/72 Commission v. Council 104 or because in substance they already entail the final decision. 105 As AG Slynn explained, 'one should not examine too minutely whether a step marked the culmination of an administrative procedure', since 'it is not the preliminary or definitive nature of the examination which matters (…), but only the question whether the concrete legal effects intended by the measures in question are provisional ones.'
Intermediate measures may be subject to review when they constitute a gravamen for the applicant 'independently from the final decision' which formally closes the procedure. 106 In the IBM Case, the CJEU established a substantive test to identify reviewable measures. A decision for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU does not need to take one of the forms of Article 288 TFEU. 107 There is a difference between a decision in the sense of the final measure that is formally adopted in a procedure, and a decision in the sense of a measure that expresses an authority's definitive position on a matter. The need to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are applied in a uniform manner throughout the Community requires that they should be interpreted independently'. one that would be coherent with the one used by the CJEU, in the sense that it is guided by the same principles of judicial protection. That criterion, expressed in the IBM test, enables -though textually not in a self-evident way -the challenge of non-final measures. The CJEU is aware of the limitations of its jurisdiction, and therefore deferred to national courts the task of reviewing measures using the same substantive test it endorses. Furthermore, it was those same limitations that led the CJEU to adapt the IBM criterion, which by no means obliges private parties to challenge intermediate procedural measures. Individuals may do so, but they may also challenge the final decision. The jurisdictional Borelli principle entails an adaptation of the substantive test of IBM. That adaptation is justified by the CJEU's absence of jurisdiction over national measures, which makes the use of the technique of procedural concentration impossible. Because the Court may not examine whether the law was observed in all stages of the administrative procedure, private parties must invoke the irregularities of national intermediate measures that determine the procedure's outcome, and they must do so before national courts. . The exceptional admissibility of annulment claims against intermediate administrative measures adopted by the EU Direct Administration became the rule in European composite procedures in which national decisionmaking predominates.
Conclusion: Coherence Between Administrative
Reality and the Dualistic System of Judicial Protection?
The intricate scenario of judicial protection set out by the CJEU is seen by some as symptomatic of the structural inadequacy of dualistic administrative justice to deal with composite decision-making. Criticism, in this case, is directed not at the case law itself, but at the very rules governing the EU's multilevel judiciary. For my part, I hold this criticism to be valid. While the Treaties' scheme of division of judicial competence and system of remedies have not undergone any reform that substantially questioned the dualistic system of administrative justice, the truth is that the EU legal landscape has known a remarkable increase in the sheer numbers and relevance of administrative procedures in which national and EU bodies do not decide in an independent way as the dualistic model assumes, but interdependently. The judicial system of the EU cannot coherently accommodate a significant amount of European administrative action anymore without ad hoc solutions like the Borelli doctrine. The principles guiding the dualistic system of independent (even if cooperative) spheres of administrative authority are simply not the same as those that inform the legislative creation of composite procedures, which are interdependent administrative decision-making processes. Accordingly, a judicial system that as- The merits of these proposals are not in dispute here. But one should bear in mind that the peculiarities of the EU give rise to a series of obstacles for such far-reaching reforms. Given the fact that the Treaties need to go through a lengthy and complex process for reform, which, as history has proven, by no means comes with a guarantee of success, the EU system of administrative justice is remarkably rigid and resistant to evolution. This is indisputably one of the reasons why the EU's own system of judicial protection has grown 'increasingly out of line with the administrative laws of the Member States '. 117 Furthermore, the proposition in particular to give EU courts the power to assess the validity of national measures could prove especially difficult from a political point of view. Another solution which could be debated is formalising the Borelli doctrine and thereby seeking to correct its flaws. Arguably, this could eventually be done even with an instrument of secondary law aimed at coordinating the two levels of administration.
118 Such an instrument could make it mandatory for national authorities to notify to the eventual applicant the issue of domestic intermediate measures that are subsumable to the type envisioned by the jurisdictional Borelli principle, so as to facilitate judicial challenge before the EU body adopts the final decision. Otherwise, the legislator could establish standstill clauses providing for a short period between the adoption of that measure and the adoption of the final Commission decision so that individuals have the chance to challenge the latter. 119 Lastly, and more boldly, such an instrument could establish the possibility to notify the Commission of national judicial decisions annulling intermediate measures and also establish a corresponding obligation for the Commission to withdraw any final decision it would have issued in the meantime, based on those measures. Of course, a reform of this kind could still not deliver the same result as a badly needed reform in primary law to bring harmony between EU administrative justice and the current shape of EU administration. Regardless of how politically difficult such a reform may be.
AG Jacobs in C-50/00 P UPA, § 85.
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The legal basis for such an instrument could be Article 197 TFEU, since it would surely not produce the harmonisation of national administrative laws, but rather schemes of coordination 118 between EU bodies and the authorities of the Member States. Arguably, the EU legislator could find an implicit power to enact rules of the nature suggested in the text, since if the EU is competent to legislate administrative procedures in a given area, it may also coordinate the different jurisdictions involved in those decision-making procedures through mechanisms of this kind. A possible problem of this solution would be the concrete choice for how long the standstill period should last. A longer period would make administrative decision-making very cumber-119 some and slow; a shorter period would make it difficult for individuals to prepare the claims they would present to court. I thank Professor Paola Chirulli for raising this point in the discussion of an earlier version of this paper.
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